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Abstract Concerns for relative performance are integrated into a model
of contractual renegotiation in bilateral trade. It is shown that concerns
for relative performance do never impede eﬃcient trade. Moreover, condi-
tional on renegotiation to occur, concerns for relative performance tend to
mitigate material rent expropriation. However, concerns for relative perfor-
mance make the occurrence of renegotiation more likely, and may thereby
lead to underinvestment even in very optimistic environments. The analysis
suggests an explanation for the occurrence of the Druzhba pipeline conflict
between Russia and Belarus in January 2007.
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1. Introduction
In long-term bilateral trading relationships, it is not uncommon to observe
that original price agreements are renegotiated at a later stage. Such rene-
gotiation should be predicted, for instance, whenever just one party to the
contract does not find trade profitable enough at the conditions of the original
contract (Hart and Moore, 1988, MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993). A gain in
material eﬃciency may then be possible only if the reluctant party obtains
a more attractive contract oﬀer before decisions about trade are made. The
consequence of renegotiation to an eﬃcient outcome is that long-term con-
tracts ensure not always the protection of relationship-specific investments.
Indeed, renegotiation, unless specifically designed by parties with commit-
ment power (Chung, 1994, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey, 1994, Noldeke
and Schmidt, 1995), typically leads to an ex-post expropriation of rents, and
therefore often to suboptimal levels of relationship-specific investments.3
As we will argue in the present paper, this prevalent view on renegotiation
in bilateral trade as being triggered solely by material ineﬃciency may not
be general enough to capture all economic applications of general interest.
For instance, when prices for oil and gas soared in recent years, the Russian
authorities found it increasingly hard to accept that neighboring countries
such as Belarus made significant profits from selling inexpensive oil deliver-
ies from Russia at much higher prices to various European countries. This
specific conflict culminated in January 2007 in the temporary closure of the
important Druzhba pipeline by the Russian government. Our theoretical
framework is consistent with the observations made in this case study.
We discuss the trade dispute between Russia and Belarus in more detail in
3The hold-up ineﬃciency, i.e., the financial risk associated with relationship-specific
investments in uncertain or complex environments, has been described extensively by
Williamson (1975, 1985). Joskow (1987) oﬀers an insightful discussion of the hold-up
problem in the context of the coal industry. The theoretical analysis of the hold-up began
with Grout (1984) who studied renegotiation in the context of labor unions. The basic
modeling idea has been further developed into various directions, for instance by Tirole
(1986) and (in the context of property rights) by Grossman and Hart (1986).
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the subsequent section. There, we point out that the renegotiations pushed
by Russia since spring 2006 do not correspond to the prevalent understand-
ing in economic theory that renegotiations are aiming at an improvement in
material eﬃciency. Instead we argue that Russia started renegotiations be-
cause it was not “content” with a situation in which Belarus made significant
profits with subsidized oil imports from Russia. We employ the linear model
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to study concerns for relative performance in the
fundamental incomplete contracting environment that had been proposed by
Hart and Moore (1988). For concreteness, we assume that each contractual
party compares itself with the respective other party, but in principle, the
argument should work analogously for alternative reference points.
We show first that concerns for relative performance alone should not lead
to ex-post ineﬃciency. That is, even though parties care for relative per-
formance and bargaining power is endogenously assigned, the outcome of
the renegotiation stage should be be materially eﬃcient. According to this
finding, it cannot happen that trading is obstructed just because one party
could fear that the other party becomes relatively even wealthier. A second
positive result says that the expropriation of material rents is mitigated with
concerns for relative performance. This finding should be intuitive. It is
more diﬃcult to exploit a party in the weaker bargaining position if that
party has concerns for relative performance.
However, all else being equal, renegotiation is more likely to occur with con-
cerns for relative performance. This result is obtained by the combination
of two facts. First, there will be scenarios in which the seller, say, finds the
price not too low to generate a positive sales margin, but too low in relation
to the valuation of the buyer. Indeed, with a utility function that reflects
concerns for relative performance, this seller would be credible to unilaterally
decide against trade, and so the buyer, interested to get the deal through,
would have to make a new contract oﬀer that improves the conditions of
the seller suﬃciently to make trade attractive even with taking account of
the concerns for relative performance. The other fact that is responsible for
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the monotonicity result is that a concern for relative performance can never
lead to a situation in which an eﬃcient trading possibility is not exploited
by rational agents.
As a consequence of the increased likelihood of renegotiation, incentives for
relationship-specific investments may be significantly weakened when par-
ties have concerns for relative performance. We show that even for a very
“optimistic” and symmetric environment in which eﬃciency can be achieved
easily between parties with traditional utility specification, the anticipation
of renegotiation due to relative performance considerations will make it im-
possible to implement the first best with a contract that treats the parties
in an equitable way.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief account
of the events related to the Druzhba pipeline closure. In Section 3, we outline
the model, and analyze the ex-post stage. Section 4 discusses incentives for
investment. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains technical proofs.
2. The Druzhba pipeline dispute
Connecting the rich oil fields of Western Siberia, the Ural, and the Caspian
Sea with refineries located in various continental European countries, the
Druzhba pipeline system with a length of about 2,500 miles is usually con-
sidered as one of the main energy backbones of Europe. Especially Germany
and Poland, but also the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Hungary
rely on the undisturbed working of this connection with its capacity of about
2 million barrels per day.4 As can be seen in Figure 1, the pipeline transports
crude oil over the territory of Belarus, a former “fraternal socialist ally” at
the times of the Soviet Union. Contractual arrangements about prices of oil
deliveries date back to times of mutual political support. The name Druzhba
means “friendship” in Russian.
4The average supply during 2006 had been about 1.2 million barrel per day (a barrel
corresponds to approximately 159 liters).
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Investments into pipelines are clearly of a relationship-specific nature. All
parties involved suﬀer significant losses even from temporary disruptions of
supplies. Russia is dependent on the transit through Belarus because of
the size of the regular oil deliveries. Redirecting all of the oil normally sent
through the transit connection may be diﬃcult if not economically unfeasible.
For instance, Ukraine has not a suﬃcient capacity to replace Belarus as a
transit country for oil deliveries. On the other hand, the well-being of the
Belarusian economy hinges on the performance of the oil sector. In fact, it
has been argued in the media that, to avoid a potential crisis, the country
needs to implement economic reforms more urgently before Russian demands
can be satisfied.
The Druzhba trade conflict was not an isolated event, but represented an
escalation of negotiations about the prices for gas and oil that had been
ongoing for some years between the governments of Russia and Belarus. As
Gennady Chuﬀrin, deputy director of the Institute for World Economy and
International Relations, put it recently: “Russia doesn’t see any returns on
its investments in Belarus.”5 While a deal for gas deliveries and company
shares had been struck with much eﬀort in late December of the year 2006,
the problem of an appropriate price for oil proved to be more diﬃcult to
resolve. The contractual agreement of 1995 was that Russia delivers oil
at low prices to Belarus, which in turn should have send 85 percent of its
profits back to Russia (which it never did). During spring 2006, the Kremlin
tried actively to buy itself into the Belarusian energy sector, targeting in
particular the gas monopolist Beltransgaz. With Minsk remaining firm, the
dispute between Russia and Belarus assumed a new dimension in late 2006.
After announcements made in December 2006, Russian authorities took two
measures in early January of the year 2007 directed at preventing Belarus
from re-exporting inexpensive Russian resources to Western Europe at world
market prices. First, the state-controlled Gazprom company raised the price
5More drastic formulations were used in the media. E.g., Global Insight (January 2007)
wrote that “the Russian government became so annoyed with being financially milked that
it decided to draw the line at all costs.”
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of its gas to Belarus from USD 46 to USD 100 per 1,000 cubic meter. Second,
Russia introduced an export tariﬀ vis-a`-vis Belarus of USD 80 per ton of oil.6
The government in Minsk sought to impress Russia in return by imposing
a transit duty of USD 45 per ton for oil delivered from Russia to Europe.
However, Transneft, the Russian oil company operating the Druzhba pipeline,
refused to pay this “illegal” fee, arguing that such a fee could not be applied
to goods in transit. But then, at least according to Russian sources, Minsk
responded by confiscating, from January 6 onwards, oil from the transit
pipeline, oil that was destined for European customers. Over the following
two days, 79.000 tons out of 91.000 tons had apparently been drawn from
the pipeline. On Monday, January 8, Russia, publicly accusing Belarus of
stealing oil from the pipeline, halted its oil exports to Central and West-
ern Europe passing through Belarus. In fact, Russian authorities threatened
to further disrupt European supplies. These dramatic steps taken by the
Russian government brought the conflict to the attention of the general pop-
ulation in Europe (see, e.g., Financial Times, 2007, Business Week Online,
2007).
After three days of uncertainty, in which the behavior of the Russian govern-
ment was openly condemned by various national authorities and international
organizations, the issue was finally settled. Belarusian President Alexander
Lukashenko conceded, in a conversation over phone with his Russian coun-
terpart Vladimir Putin, to drop the transit fee on Russian oil. With more
than half of the exports from Belarus going to Russia, Putin had a signifi-
cant bargaining power that might have helped him in the negotiation with
Lukashenko. On the evening of Wednesday, January 10, Russia resumed de-
liveries through the pipeline system. Simultaneously, Belarus began releasing
nearly 80,000 tons of oil from the country’s depots to its foreign customers,
6The Russian gas and oil industry is dominated by the two main actors Rosneft and
Gasprom. Both companies are majority-owned by the Russian government. Gas and oil
are considered by Russia as a strategic industries, i.e., control by foreign companies will
not be tolerated, and further control, if not yet established, will be actively sought.
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as a compensation of the purportedly tapped oil resources. However, it is
generally perceived by insiders that the compromises obtained, both in the
case of gas and in the case of oil, will not resolve the trade conflict between
Russia and Belarus in the long term.
The Druzhba cutoﬀ was not the first event of this sort. Starting in 2005,
the Russian government has persuaded a number of former members of the
Soviet Union into accepting higher prices for gas and oil. Georgia, Moldova,
and Azerbaijan are among these. A year ago, Russian gas supplies to Europe
were interrupted for four days following a price dispute between Russia and
Ukraine.
3. The model
The case of the transit dispute illustrates the possibility that renegotiation
may be the consequence of the unilateral perception by one party to a con-
tract to receive an inappropriate share of the surplus created by the trade.
Indeed, with oil prices rising (with some temporary downswings) to higher
and higher levels, the Russian government might have observed the compara-
bly sound development of the Belarusian economy in recent years with mixed
feelings. This section outlines a model of a trading relationship between two
parties that care for relative economic performance.
Our set-up is as follows. Two contractual parties, a seller (S) and a buyer (B),
perceive the possibility to enter a potentially profitable trading relationship.
The time horizon decomposes into an ex ante and an ex post period, as
depicted in Figure 2. Ex ante, parties may agree on some contract for future
trade. We will assume a trading technology that allows trading at will (cf.
Hart and Moore, 1988), so that a court can only observe whether there has
been trade or not. Under this assumption, contracts will be of the form
(bp0, bp1), where bp0 is the transfer from the buyer to the seller in case of no
trade, and bp1 is the transfer from the buyer to the seller in the case of trade.
This type of contract is consistent with the take-or-pay provisions that have
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been reported for natural gas by Masten and Crocker (1985) and Hubbard
and Weiner (1986).
After signing the contract, but still ex ante, seller and buyer each select a
respective level of relationship-specific investments iS ≥ 0 and iB ≥ 0. With-
out loss of generality we assume that investments cause no additional costs to
either buyer or seller.7 Investments are not contractible, but parties can ob-
serve mutual investment levels and are consequently symmetrically informed
throughout the trading relationship. Throughout the analysis, investments
are assumed to be selfish, i.e., the seller’s investments do not increase the
buyer’s valuation of the traded good, nor do the buyer’s investments lower
the seller’s cost of production.
Ex post, the observable, but non-contractible state of the world ω ∈ Ω re-
alizes, where Ω denotes the set of possible states of the world, and through
its realization, a cost function c(iS, ω) for the seller, and a value function
v(iB, ω) for the buyer. The cost is an opportunity cost, and must be paid
only if trade occurs. Similarly, the value is understood to be relative to
the best alternative, for the buyer, in the ex-post situation. We assume the
following simplified renegotiation protocol:
• If both parties prefer trade over no trade at the conditions of the original
contract, then there is no renegotiation, and trade occurs.
• If the seller (buyer) prefers trade, and the buyer (seller) prefers no trade
at the conditions of the original contract, then the seller (buyer) may
send a new signed contract oﬀer (p0, p1) to the buyer (seller); there is
trade when the oﬀer makes the buyer (seller) at least indiﬀerent to the
outside option.
• If non of the parties prefers trade over no trade at the conditions of the
original contract then parties do not renegotiate, and there is no trade.
7When actual costs diﬀer from investments, then a straightforward application of the
chain rule shows that all results of the paper remain valid in the more general set-up.
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As shown by Noldeke und Schmidt (1995), this trading protocol corresponds
to a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of a fully tractable message game
between buyer and seller.
After the completion of the renegotiation stage, the parties decide simulta-
neously whether to trade or to not trade at the (potentially new) conditions
(p0, p1). The seller’s net reward is then given by
xS(iS, ω) = pq − qc(iS, ω)− iS,
where pq denotes the price paid by the buyer to the seller in the ex-post
stage. Analogously, the buyer’s net reward is given by
xB(iS, ω) = qv(iB, ω)− pq − iB.
Contractual parties may have concerns for relative performance. For speci-
ficity, the utility functions are defined as in Fehr in Schmidt (1999), that
is
uS = xS − αSmax{xB − xS, 0}
uB = xB − αBmax{xS − xB, 0},
where we dropped the arguments of the functions xS and xB.8 We assume
that parameters measuring the extent of disutility from unequal relative per-
formance are given by αS ∈ [0; 1) and αB ∈ [0; 1). Apparently, the limit case
αS = αB = 0 corresponds to the traditional linear specification of the util-
ity function. Note also that, because social preferences are invariant under
monotone aﬃne transformations of the utility function, the model would be
no more general with a second term for “altruistic” inequity aversion.9
8This assumption is made for convenience only. It will become clear that the results
obtained in this paper do not depend on the specific functional form.
9For alternative approaches to modeling concerns for relative performance, see Bolton
(1991) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), for instance.
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With traditional quasi-linear utility functions, which are prevalent in main
contract-theoretic applications, eﬃciency is tantamount to maximizing wel-
fare, i.e. to maximizing the sum of individual utility levels. With social
utilities, however, utility between individuals is no longer transferable. Only
net rewards can be easily transferred via monetary payments between the
parties. This does not leave welfare constant because measure of relative
performance will react to the shift of wealth from one party to another. To
avoid confusion, we will try to take the appropriate amount of care in the
definitions of first-best and second-best allocations.
First best. In the first best for parties with concerns for relative perfor-
mance, gains of trade are shared in an equitable way ex post, and investments
ex ante are as if the parties had traditional utility specifications. Formally,
denote by iFBS and i
FB
B the investment levels that maximize total surplus in
the case of traditional utilities, i.e.,
(iFBS , i
FB
B ) = arg max
(iS ,iB)
Eω[max{v(iB, ω)− c(iS, ω); 0}− iS − iB],
where Eω[.] denotes the expectated value with respect to the uncertain state
of the world. The first best between parties with concerns for relative per-
formance now corresponds to the eﬃcient investment ex ante, trade ex-post
if and only if v ≥ c, and a price pFBq (ω) that equalizes net rewards, i.e.
pFBq (ω)− qc(iS, ω)− iFBS = qv(iB, ω)− pFBq (ω)− iFBB .
Rearranging yields
pFBq (ω) = q
v(iB, ω) + c(iS, ω)
2
+
iFBS − iFBB
2
.
More generally, given investment levels iS, iB, and a state ω, we write
p#q (iS, iB, ω) = q
v(iB, ω) + c(iS, ω)
2
+
iS − iB
2
for the fair ex-post price for trading quantity q. The price p#q is fair in the
sense that parties are equally well oﬀ in terms of net rewards provided that
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quantity q is traded at price p#q . It can be easily seen that, following a trade
of quantity q at price pq, the buyer is relatively better oﬀ than the seller if
and only if pq < p#q and that the seller is relatively better oﬀ than the buyer
if and only if pq < p#q .
Ex-post eﬃciency. Figure 3 shows a renegotiation scenario in which the
buyer is relatively better oﬀ than the seller in case of no trade at price bp0, and
the seller does not wish to trade at the conditions of the original contract.
Material eﬃciency is achieved in all cases.
Proposition 1. Concerns for relative economic performance do never im-
pede materially eﬃcient trade.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
Why can’t it happen that concerns for relative performance inhibit ex-post
eﬃcient trade? Assume that trade is materially eﬃcient. Then, with “quasi-
linear” utility, a failure of renegotiation could only happen when the total of
the monetary equivalents of the changes in the concerns for relative perfor-
mance would exceed the gains from trade v − c. However, in principle, i.e.,
ignoring the specific renegotiation protocol for the moment, gains from trade
could be shared such that the disutility from inequity would not increase for
either buyer or seller. In our linear model, specifically, this could be achieved
by sharing the gains from trade equally between buyer and seller. Thus,
free (Coasian) bargaining between rational agents should lead to successful
renegotiation to the superior utility possibility curve. In contrast to free bar-
gaining, the Hart-Moore-protocol assigns bargaining power as a function of
history to either buyer or seller. While this diﬀerence aﬀects the distribution
of the gains of shares, it should not impair the parties’ ability to reach the
higher eﬃciency frontier.10
10This intuition suggests that it should be possible to generalize the argument to more
general utility specifications provided that gains in material eﬃciency shift outwards the
inequity-averse utility possibility curve.
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The first point to note is that concerns for relative performance make it more
diﬃcult for one party to expropriate rents.
Proposition 2. Conditional on renegotiation to occur, concerns for relative
economic performance mitigate the expropriation of material rents. That is,
given (bp0, bp1), iS, iB, and ω such that parties with traditional utility specifi-
cation renegotiate the initial contract, the renegotiated oﬀer submitted by the
buyer (seller) involves a price p1 that is weakly higher (weakly lower) for par-
ties with concerns for relative performance than for parties with traditional
utility specification.
There are two countervailing eﬀects. On the one hand, the take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer may involve that the party that is supposed to accept the oﬀer will
thereby be relatively worse oﬀ than the other party. To account for concerns
for relative performance, the proposal must in these cases be more generous.
The second eﬀect, mitigating the first but never more than compensating it,
originates from the fact that higher investments by the party that receives
the oﬀer may change that party’s perception of what an appropriate price
would be.
To see both eﬀects in force, consider a scenario that the buyer makes a new
contract proposal to the seller. In this case, the buyer increases the initial
price bp1 to
p1 = bp0 + c+ αS
1 + 2αS
(v − c)| {z }
envy grant
− 2αS
1 + 2αSv
max{bp0 − p#0 , 0}| {z }
idleness tax
,
where p#0 = (iS − iB)/2, as before. The envy grant reflects the amount by
which the buyer has to increase the price to account for the fact that the
value of trade happens to be “large” as a consequence of a pure random
eﬀect. The contribution eﬀect captures the idea that the diﬀerential between
the parties’ investment levels aﬀects the relative economic position. For
instance, if the seller invested less than the buyer, and the ex-ante agreed
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no-trade price would not compensate the buyer in an appropriate way, then
rent expropriation will be easier for the buyer.
But under which conditions does renegotiation occur with concerns for rela-
tive performance? In the standard analysis, i.e., for αS = αB = 0, an eﬃcient
constellation of cost and value realizations is accompanied with renegotiation
is precisely one party prefers trade over no trade at the conditions of the origi-
nal contract. Thus assume that buyer and seller agreed on a contract (bp0, bp1).
We shall drop the arguments of cost and value functions in the sequel. Then
renegotiation will occur for v ≥ c in the standard model if and only if either
the buyer prefers trade and the seller prefers no trade at the conditions of
the initial contract, i.e., if
v − bp1 > −bp0 and bp1 − c < bp0 (1)
or if the buyer prefers no trade and the seller prefers trade at the conditions
of the initial contract, i.e., if
v − bp1 < −bp0 and bp1 − c > bp0. (2)
With concerns for relative performance, conditions (1) and (2) are enriched
by envy terms. The buyer wishes to trade at the conditions of the original
contract provided that
v − bp1 − αBmax{bp1 − c− iS)− (v − bp1 − iB), 0}
≥ −bp0 − αBmax{(bp0 − iS)− (−bp0 − iB), 0}.
On the other hand, the seller prefers trade provided that
bp1 − c− αSmax{(v − bp1 − iB)− (bp1 − c− iS), 0}
≥ bp0 − αSmax{(−bp0 − iB)− (bp0 − iS), 0}.
We will show now that the probability of renegotiation is never lower between
parties with concerns for relative performance than between parties with
traditional utility specification.
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Figure 3 exhibits the indiﬀerence curves (between trade and no trade under
the conditions of the original contract) for buyer and seller in (c, v)-space.
Concerns for relative performance are reflected here by kinks of the respective
indiﬀerence curves at the intersection point with the cross diagonal defined
by the equation
v + c
2
= bp1 − p#0 . (3)
Indeed, when (3) is satisfied, then
xB − xS = (v − bp1 − iB)− (bp1 − c− iS) = 2(v + c
2
− bp1 + p#0 ) = 0.
so that the net rewards of buyer and seller coincide. When
v + c
2
> bp1 − p#0 ,
then the buyer is better oﬀ, while for the reversed inequality, the seller is
better oﬀ. The next result assigns a role to inequity aversion as a trigger for
re-negotiation.
Proposition 3. Fix (bp0, bp1), iS ≥ 0, and iB ≥ 0. Then for any state ω
in which renegotiation occurs between parties with traditional utility specifi-
cation, there is also renegotiation between parties with concerns for relative
economic performance.
Thus, economic agents that care about relative performance are more likely
to renegotiate any given contract.
The following example scenario captures the logic of the general argument.
Assume that the buyer is relatively better oﬀ than the seller in the case of no
trade at the conditions of the initial contract. Assume also that without envy,
the buyer prefers trade, while the seller prefers no trade at the conditions of
the initial contract, i.e.,
v − bp1 > −bp0 and bp1 − c < bp0.
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The area in (c, v) space where this occurs is shaded in Figure 4. But in this
case, trade can only increase the diﬀerential in net rewards because
(v − bp1 − iB)− (bp1 − c− iS) > (−bp0 − iB)− (bp0 − iS) > 0.
Thus, in this case trade can only increase envy! This fact has two implica-
tions. First, the buyer, who is relatively better oﬀ in the case of no trade,
remains relatively better oﬀ in the case of trade. Thus, the envy terms vanish
for the buyer, so the buyer’s decision is unaﬀected by concerns for relative
performance in this scenario. For the seller, however, the envy term would
increases by trade. Thus, the seller’s preference for no trade is even more
pronounced in the case that the seller has concerns for relative performance.
In general, the point to note is that the contractual party with traditional
utility specification that prefers no trade at the conditions of the original con-
tract can only deteriorate its relative economic performance through trading
with a party that prefers trade. Thus, the envy term for the unwilling party
can only increase with trade, while the envy term for the willing party can
only decrease with trade. Thus, renegotiation is more likely with envy.
When the support of the distribution of cost and value parameters is suﬃ-
ciently dispersed, then Proposition 3 can be strengthened to a strict compar-
ative statics. Assume for the moment that buyer is relatively better oﬀ than
the seller in the case of no trade, i.e.,
bp0 ≤ p#0 = iS − iB2 . (4)
The seller will prefer trade over no trade at the conditions of the original
contract whenever
c ≤ bp1 − bp0 + 2αS(p#0 − bp0)− 2αS{v + c2 + p#0 − bp1}+.
Thus, for
v + c
2
< bp1 − p#0 ,
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the indiﬀerence curve of the seller will run parallel to the v-axis at value
c = bp1 − bp0 + 2αS(p#0 − bp0).
But upwards from its intersection point with the line of equal performance
v + c
2
= bp1 − p#0 ,
the seller’s indiﬀerence curve tilts to the left-hand side and crosses the point
(bp1 − bp0; bp1 − bp0). In contrast, for αS = 0, the indiﬀerence curve would run,
over its whole length, parallel to the v-axis at value c = bp1−bp0. Thus, there is
a wedge-shaped domain where renegotiation occurs between agents that care
for relative economic performance, but not between agents with a traditional
utility specification. Another area where this appears as well is an upper-left
wedge starting at the intersection point of the line of equal performance with
the line v = bp1 − bp0 (cf. Figure 4).
Proposition 4. Assume that the pair of random variables (c; v) has support
[c; c] × [v; v] for constants 0 < c < c and 0 < v < v. Then, for an initial
contract (bp0, bp1) satisfying
c < bp1 − bp0 < v, (5)
and for any pair of relationship-specific investment levels iS ≥ 0 and iB ≥ 0,
the probability of renegotiation is strictly higher for parties with concerns for
relative performance than for parties with traditional utility specification
Propositions 2 and 3 reflect the point that strongly increasing oil prices can
induce oil producing countries to start renegotiations with their customers
and transit partners, even if the variable costs for production do not change,
the eﬃcient quantity is not significantly aﬀected by the price change, and a
positive profit margin would result for both parties also in the case of the
originally agreed price level.
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4. Incentives for investment
It has been shown in the previous section that with concerns for relative
performance, rent extraction at the ex-post stage is more diﬃcult. On the
other hand, contractual agreements made at the ex ante stage are generally
less reliable as a predictor of the trading conditions in the ex post stage. A
natural question to ask is therefore whether these eﬀect leads to diminished
or to strengthened incentives for relationship-specific investments.
Our final result shows that, from an ex ante perspective, the increased prob-
ability of renegotiation may lead to underinvestment even if the economic
environment is very “optimistic.” For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to a
scenario which is “symmetric.” Assume that cost and value realizations are
independent, and that c = c with probability F (iS), and c = c with proba-
bility 1−F (iS) for some increasing and diﬀerentiable function F (.). Assume
also that v = v with probability F (iB), and v = v with probability 1−F (iS).
Assume also that
c < c < v < v,
with
v − v = c− c. (6)
Finally, assume that αS = αB = α. There is a unique contract that treats
parties symmetrically here, given by
(bp0, bp1) = (0; v + c
2
). (7)
The following example illustrates the ineﬃciency problem.
Proposition 5. Consider the symmetric scenario outlined above, and as-
sume that
α >
1
2
v − c
v − v . (8)
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If then the eﬃcient probabilities F (iFBS ) = F (iFBB ) are too low, then the unique
contract (7) that treats parties symmetrically leads to ineﬃcient investment
levels.
The intuition for this result is the following. Renegotiation is predicted
by the model when the realizations of cost and value parameters lead to
an inequitable situation. Specifically, when both costs and values are high,
then the buyer makes a price concession to the seller, while when both costs
and value are low, then the seller makes a a concession to the buyer. This
has an impact on the incentives to invest. For the buyer, for instance, the
marginal utilitarian return from investment is above the eﬃcient level when
costs are low, but the marginal utilitarian return from investment is below
the eﬃcient level when costs are high. Thus, when eﬃciency requires a
suﬃciently low probability for low costs, then incentives to invest will be too
weak for the buyer. Thus, even in this very optimistic scenario, the first-best
investment levels are no achievable with a simple contract that treats both
parties symmetrically.
5. Related literature
There is a significant body of literature that is related to the present paper.
This section reviews some closely related contributions.
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) discuss oil pipelines as one of several
examples illustrating their conceptual framework. While their discussion fo-
cuses on a case with multiple wells and a cluster of refineries, their description
of the appropriable parts of the quasi-rents in the pipeline industry should
apply without much change to the Druzhba episode. However, their dis-
cussion seems to be silent about concerns for relative economic performance
between contractual partners that perceive themselves as potential peers on
an international political stage.
Masten (1988) considers a rent-seeking model of a long-term trading relation-
ship in which buyer and seller may individually trigger costly re-negotiation
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to a more equitable outcome when unsatisfied with the terms of trade spec-
ified in the original contract. Under the assumptions made in the paper, a
party to the contract initiates re-negotiation whenever the additional share
of the quasi-rents thereby obtainable exceeds the transaction cost of re-
negotiation for that party. It is shown that the expected sum of transac-
tion costs for buyer and seller is minimized when the ex-ante contract speci-
fies a price that equilibrates the cost-weighted hazards from post-agreement
haggling. Section 4 in Masten’s paper is particularly interesting because it
surveys early evidence on equity provisions in long-term contracts.
In a discussion of Masten’s paper, Hellwig (1988) considers several variants
of the rent-seeking model, one of which is quite close in spirit to the present
analysis. In a nutshell, a buyer and a seller agree to exchange a single unit of
an indivisible item at a price p. Subsequently, they obtain precise estimates
of the buyer’s valuation v > 0 of the item and of the seller’s opportunity cost
c. The seller may now either deliver the item at the conditions of the original
contract or may request re-negotiation. If the seller requests re-negotiation,
the buyer’s valuation in case of a failure of re-negotiations reduces to δv,
where 0 < δ < 1 is an exogenous parameter. In addition, renegotiation
incurs a transaction cost rS ≥ 0 to the seller. When trade is eﬃcient, then a
seller that is willing to trade at the conditions of the original contract would
initiate renegotiation for any suﬃciently low value of rS and would thereby
manage to raise the price by v(1− δ)/2, where any potential eﬃciency gain
has been split equally between buyer and seller. Thus, as pointed out by
Hellwig, the increase in the seller’s rent from requesting re-negotiation would
be independent of the initial purchase price in this type of model. For our
present analysis, we draw the conclusion that hazard equilibriation may not
describe relative performance considerations as well as social preferences.
Hart and Moore (2006) study ex-post ineﬃciencies resulting from behavioral
responses to an initial contract. [...to be completed...]
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6. Conclusion
In a world with incomplete contracting possibilities, partners to a trading
relationship may find themselves in a situation where they would like to
rewrite the original contract to reach a mutually beneficial outcome. In this
paper, we have argued that the focus on material ineﬃciency in bilateral
trade may not always capture the true motives for ex-post quarreling by a
contractual party.
As an example illustrating our claim, we have discussed the recent closure
of the Druzhba pipeline that, under normal circumstances, delivers crude
oil from Russia to Europe in transit of the territory of Belarus, and se-
cures thereby a significant part of the energy requirements for several devel-
oped economies, including Germany and various Central European countries.
Based on this example, we have argued that a material disposition may not
be the necessary prerequisite for renegotiation to occur, when parties to the
trading relationship care also about relative economic performance. Renego-
tiation may also occur, so we argued, when only one party is unhappy with
the idea that the other party ends up with a significant surplus while the
own surplus appears much smaller.
It has been shown that, while trade is ex-post materially eﬃcient and con-
ditional on renegotiation, rent expropriation is smoothed, the probability of
renegotiation typically increases with concerns for relative performance. In
particular, the model captures the eﬀect that one party refuses to trade at
the conditions of the original contract, even though it does not posses any
bargaining power, and trade would be materially eﬃcient. As a consequence,
it may be more diﬃcult to implement eﬃcient incentives to invest between
parties with concerns for relative performance.11
11If take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers are not feasible, and trading may occur at several points in
time, then the situation changes dramatically. In Ewerhart (2006), we have shown that, for
a suﬃciently productive technology, concerns for relative performance allow approximating
the first best incentives as parties get increasingly patient.
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider first the case in which the buyer is
relatively better oﬀ than the seller in the case of no trade, i.e., bp0 ≤ p#0 . We
have to show that trade occurs whenever trade is eﬃcient (i.e., v ≥ c). If both
buyer and seller prefer trade over no trade at the conditions of the original
contract, then the assumed renegotiation protocol implies trade. There are
three remaining cases:
Case 1. Only the buyer prefers trade over no trade at the conditions of the
original contract. According to our trading protocol, the buyer may then send
a new oﬀer to the seller. The only candidate for this oﬀer is the price level
p1 that makes the seller indiﬀerent between trading at p1 and not trading atbp0. Indeed, any oﬀer lower than p1 will be in vain because it is not accepted
by the seller. On the other hand, any oﬀer exceeding p1 is dominated by
a slightly smaller oﬀer. We will check now that it is incentive compatible
for the buyer to send the oﬀer p1 rather than no oﬀer. To identify p1, we
show first that p1 has the property that the buyer is relatively better oﬀ than
the seller when trade occurs at price p1. To provoke a contradiction, assume
that the buyer is not relatively better oﬀ than the seller when trade occurs
at price p1, i.e.,
v − p1 − iB < p1 − c− iS. (9)
Then the price level p1 at which the seller is indiﬀerent between no-trade at
price p0 and under trade at price p1 is given implicitly by
p1 − c− iS = bp0 − iS − αS(−bp0 − iB − (bp0 − iS)).
Solving for p1 yields
p1 = bp0 + c. (10)
Moreover, (9) is tantamount to
v + c
2
< p1 − p#0 .
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As p#0 ≥ bp0, this implies
v + c
2
< p1 − bp0.
Using (10) yields v < c in contradiction to our eﬃciency assumption. Thus,
we have shown that the buyer is relatively better oﬀ than the seller when
trade occurs at price p1. As a consequence, the price level p1 at which the
seller is indiﬀerent between no-trade at price p0 and under trade at price p1
is given implicitly by
p1 − c− iS − αS((v − p1 − iB)− p1 − c− iS))
= bp0 − iS − αS(−bp0 − iB − (bp0 − iS)).
Solving for p1 yields
p1 = bp0 + (1 + αS)c+ αSv
1 + 2αS
. (11)
We have to check now that it is incentive compatible for the buyer to send
this oﬀer p1 rather than no oﬀer. The buyer compares her utility from trading
at p1 with her outside option of not trading and paying bp0 to the seller. But
as
v − p1 = v − bp0 − (1 + αS)c+ αSv
1 + 2αS
=
1 + αS
1 + 2αS
(v − c)− bp0
≥ −bp0,
we have proved that the buyer will make precisely the oﬀer (11). Thus, trades
occurs in case 1.
Case 2. Only the seller prefers trade over no trade at the conditions of the
original contract. In this case, the seller may send an oﬀer to the buyer. As
in case 1, the only candidate for the oﬀer is the price level p1 that makes the
buyer indiﬀerent between trade at price p1 and no-trade at price bp0. There
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are two subcases. Assume first that the buyer is relatively better oﬀ than
the seller when trade occurs at price p1, i.e.,
v − p1 − iB ≥ p1 − c− iS. (12)
Then p1 is implicitly determined by the indiﬀerence condition
v − p1 − iB = −bp0 − iB.
Thus, in this subcase p1 = bp0 + v. Morever, the seller sends this oﬀer if
p1 − c− iS − αS((v − p1 − iB)− (p1 − c− iS))
≥ bp0 − iS − αS((−bp0 − iB)− (bp0 − iS)),
which is equivalent to v ≥ c. Hence, in the case characterized by (12), there
will be trade. Assume now that (12) does not hold, so that the buyer is not
relatively better oﬀ than the seller when trade occurs at price p1. Then p1
satisfies the buyer’s indiﬀerence condition
v − p1 − iB − αB((p1 − c− iS)− (v − p1 − iB)) = −bp0 − iB.
Solving for p1 yields
p1 =
bp0 + 2αBp#0
1 + 2αB
+
(1 + αB)v + αBc
1 + 2αB
. (13)
In the considered subcase, it is rational for the seller to send the oﬀer (13)
when
p1 − c− iS ≥ bp0 − iS − αS((−bp0 − iB)− (bp0 − iS)),
or equivalently, when
p1 ≥ bp0 + c− 2αS(p#0 − bp0). (14)
Using (13), inequality (14) can be seen to be equivalent to
(
2αB
1 + 2αB
+ 2αS)(p
#
0 − bp0) + 1 + αB1 + 2αB (v − c) ≥ 0,
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which is clearly satisfied under the assumptions made. Thus, again, trade
will result.
Case 3. Neither the seller nor the buyer prefers trade over no trade at the
conditions of the original contract. This case must be brought to a contra-
diction. There are again two subcases. We assume first that the buyer is not
relatively better oﬀ with trade at bp1 than the seller, i.e.,
v − bp1 − iB < bp1 − c− iS. (15)
Then, from the seller’s preference for no trade at the conditions of the original
contract,
bp1 − c ≤ bp0 − αS((−bp0 − iB)− (bp0 − iS)). (16)
Re-arranging (16) yields
bp1 ≤ bp0 + c− 2αS(p#0 − bp0). (17)
Similarly, from the buyer’s preference for no trade at the conditions of the
original contract, expressed by
v − bp1 − αB((bp1 − c− iS)− (v − bp1 − iB)) < −bp0,
we obtain
bp1 > bp0 + 2αB(p#0 − bp0) + αBc+ (1 + αB)v1 + 2αB . (18)
Combining (17) and (18) yields
1 + αB
1 + 2αB
(v − c) + 2(αS + αB)(p#0 − bp0) < 0. (19)
However, comparing (19) with our assumptions p#0 ≥ bp0 and v ≥ c yields
the desired contradiction. For the other subcase, assume that (15) is not
satisfied, i.e., the buyer is relatively better oﬀ than the buyer with trade
24
at bp1. Then the seller’s strict preference for no trade is expressed by the
inequality
bp1 − c− αS((v − bp1 − iB)− (bp1 − c− iS))
< bp0 − αS((−bp0 − iB)− (bp0 − iS)).
Rewriting yields
bp1 < bp0 + (1 + αS)c+ αSv
1 + 2αS
. (20)
Combining (20) with the buyer’s preference for no trade bp1 > bp0 + v yields
v < c, a contradiction.
This proves the assertion in the case that the buyer is relatively better oﬀ
with no trade at bp0. Assume now that the seller is strictly better oﬀ than the
buyer with trade at bp0. Consider a mirror ex-post scenario in which the buyer
invested imB = iS and has valuation vm = c + c− c, while the seller invested
imS = iB and has cost cm = v + v − v. Then eﬃciency in the base scenario,
i.e., v ≥ c, is tantamount to eﬃciency in the mirror scenario, i.e., vm ≥ cm.
Moreover, for the contract (bpm0 , bpm1 ) = (−bp0,−bp1), the buyer in the mirror
scenario is relatively better oﬀ with no trade at bp0. We have already proved
that in this case, eﬃcient trade will always take place in the mirror scenario.
Thus, eﬃcient trade will also occur in the base scenario. This proves the
assertion. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that parties have concerns for relative
performance. In the case
v ≥ c > bp1 − bp0, (21)
the buyer makes a proposal to the seller. By Proposition 3, the buyer prefers
trade, while the seller prefers no trade. According to the assumption about
the renegotiation protocol, the buyer sends a new contract oﬀer (p0, p1) to
the seller. Clearly, the buyer has no advantage of increasing p0 above bp0.
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Similarly, a p0 below bp0 will not find its way to the courts. Thus, without
loss of generality, p0 = bp0. Moreover, as the buyer has all the bargaining
power in this scenario, the oﬀer will satisfy
p1 − c− αSmax{(v − p1 − iB)− (p1 − c− iS); 0}
= bp0 − αSmax{(−bp0 − iB)− (bp0 − iS); 0}. (22)
Rearraging yields
p1 − 2αSmax{p#1 − p1; 0} = bp0 + c− 2αSmax{p#0 − bp0; 0}. (23)
The left-hand side of (23), considered as a function of p1, is strictly increasing,
continuous, and unbounded. Hence, there is a unique p1 that solves (23). If
p1 ≥ p#1 then
p1 = bp0 + c− 2αSmax{p#0 − bp0; 0} ≥ bp0 + c,
which proves the assertion in this case. Assume now that p1 < p
#
1 . Assumingbp0 ≥ p#0 and p1 < p#1 yields
p1 = bp0 + c+ 2αS(p#1 − p1) > bp0 + c.
Finally, if bp0 < p#0 and p1 < p#1 , then (23) is tantamount to
p1 = bp0 + (1 + αS)c+ αSv
1 + 2αS
> bp0 + c.
This proves the assertion for the case (21). The other case in which bp1−bp0 >
v ≥ c can be dealt with in a completely analogous fashion. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a state ω in which agents with tradi-
tional utility specification renegotiate. We will show that also agents with
concerns for relative economic performance renegotiate. Assume first that a
buyer with traditional utility specification would weakly prefer trade at the
conditions of the original contract, while the seller does not wish to trade.
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As trade must be eﬃcient in any state where agents with traditional utility
specification enter renegotiation, we have
v ≥ c > bp1 − bp0. (24)
We will show that the buyer with concerns for relative performance wishes to
trade at the conditions of the initial contract, while the seller with concerns
for relative performance does not wish to trade. Consider first the buyer’s
decision. Assume then that the buyer is relatively better oﬀ than the seller
with no trade at bp0, i.e., bp0 ≤ p#0 . We have to show that
v − bp1 − αBmax{(bp1 − c− iS)− (v − bp1 − iB), 0} ≥ −bp0. (25)
When the maximum term in (25) vanishes, then (25) follows immediately
from (24). Otherwise, i.e., when
(bp1 − c− iS)− (v − bp1 − iB) = 2(bp1 − p#0 − c+ v2 ) > 0 (26)
we have to show that
v − bp1 − 2αB(bp1 − p#0 − c+ v2 ) ≥ −bp0.
Re-arranging yields
αBc+ (1 + αB)v
1 + 2αB
≥ bp1 − bp0 − 2αB(p#0 − bp0),
which follows from bp0 ≤ p#0 and (24). If the seller is relatively better oﬀ with
no trade at bp0, i.e., bp0 > p#0 , then we have to show that
v − bp1 − 2αBmax{bp1 − p#0 − c+ v2 , 0} ≥ −bp0 − 2αS(bp0 − p#0 ).
(27)
This inequality is immediate when the maximum term is zero. Under (26),
however, (27) is equivalent to
αBc+ (1 + αB)v
1 + 2αB
≥ bp1 − bp0,
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which follows from (24). Consider now the seller’s decision. We have to show
that
bp1 − c− 2αSmax{c+ v
2
− bp1 + p#0 , 0} < bp0 − 2αSmax{p#0 − bp0, 0}.
(28)
Assume first that
c+ v
2
− bp1 + p#0 ≤ 0. (29)
Rewriting and using (24) yields
p#0 − bp0 ≤ bp1 − bp0 − c+ v2 ≤ 0.
Thus, if (29) is satisfied, then (28) follows from (24). If, however,
c+ v
2
− bp1 + p#0 > 0, (30)
then (28) reads
bp1 − bp0 − (1 + αS)c+ αSv
(1 + 2αS)
< 2αS(p
#
0 − bp0)− 2αSmax{p#0 − bp0, 0}.
This inequality holds certainly for p#0 ≥ bp0. But also for p#0 < bp0, (30) implies
that
p#0 − bp0 > bp1 − bp0 − c+ v2 .
This proves the first part of the Proposition in the case that (24). The other
case in which bp1− bp0 > v ≥ c is completely analogous and therefore omitted.
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Proof of Proposition 4. We will prove the first assertion for the casebp0 ≤ p#0 (the other case bp0 > p#0 can be dealt with in a completely analogous
way). In this case, the buyer is relatively better oﬀ than the seller in the no
trade scenario. Consider parameters ε > δ > 0, not necessarily small. Define
realizations of value and cost parameters
v = bp1 − bp0 + ε and c = bp1 − bp0 − δ. (31)
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These realizations lie in the support of the ex ante distribution provided that
ε ≤ v − (bp1 − bp0) and δ ≤ (bp1 − bp0)− c. (32)
With traditional utility specification, both buyer and seller wish to trade at
the conditions of the original contract, so there is no renegotiation. With
concerns for relative performance, only the buyer wishes to trade when δ/ε
suﬃciently small. To see why, note first that the buyer is relatively better oﬀ
with trade at bp1 than the seller. Indeed, a straightforward calculation shows
that
(v − bp1 − iB)− (bp1 − c− iS) = ε− δ + 2(p#0 − bp0) > 0.
The seller will strictly prefer no trade when
bp1 − c− αS(ε− δ + 2(p#0 − bp0)) < bp0 − 2αS(p#0 − bp0). (33)
Rearranging (33) using (31) yields
δ <
αS
1 + αS
ε (34)
as a the suﬃcient condition for the seller’s strict preference for no trade at
the conditions of the original contract. The buyer, on the other hand, has a
strict preference for trade at bp1 because v − bp1 ≥ −bp0. Then, renegotiation
between agents with concerns for relative performance will take place for
realizations satisfying (32) and (34), but not so for agents with a traditional
utility specification. By our support assumption (5), this type of situation
occurs with positive probability. This proves the first assertion of Proposition
4. To prove the second assertion, assume that v is so large that the seller is
unwilling to trade at the conditions of the original contract even for c = c.
From (33), this will be the case provided that
bp1 − bp0 − c < αS(ε− δ).
Using (34), a suﬃcient condition for unwillingness to trade on the part of the
seller is therefore given by
v ≥ bp1 − bp0 + 1 + αSαS (bp1 − bp0 − c).
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This proves the second assertion, and thereby the proposition. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. To provoke a contradiction, we assume that
investment levels resulting from the contract (7) are eﬃcient. We consider
the buyer’s investment decision iB, assuming that the seller chooses iFBS .
Denote by xS(q), xB(q), uS(q), and uB(q) the net rewards and utilities of
seller and buyer, respectively, when quantity q is traded. If the buyer were
to reduce iB marginally below the first-best level iFBB then
xB(0) = −iB > −iFBB = −iFBS = xS(0),
i.e., the buyer would be relatively better oﬀ than the seller in the case of
no trade at the conditions of the original contract. Hence, with no trade,
uB(0) = −iB and
uS(0) = −iFBS − αS(iFBS − iB).
These are the utility levels down to which, depending on the distribution
of the bargaining power, parties will be brought in the renegotiation stage.
It is now not diﬃcult to check that the parties will trade at the conditions
of the initial contract in states (c; v) and (c; v). Indeed, for state (c; v), by
symmetry,
xB(1) = v − bp1 − iB > v − bp1 − iFBB = bp1 − c− iFBS = xS(1).
Thus,
uB(1) =
v − c
2
− iB > −iB = uB(0)
and
uS(1) =
v − c
2
− iFBB − αS(iFBS − iB) > −iFBB − αS(iFBS − iB) = uB(1),
i.e., both parties would prefer trade over no trade at the conditions of the
initial contract. Observing that (6) implies bp1 = (v+c)/2, a similar argument
can be used to show that trade occurs also in state (c; v). In state (c; v),
xB(1) = bp1 − c− iB < bp1 − c− iFBS = xS(1)
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for a suﬃciently small deviation (iFBB − iB). Hence, in this case,
uB(1) =
v − c
2
− iB − αB((
v − c
2
− iFBS )− (
v − c
2
− iB)) > −iB = uB(0)
for a suﬃciently small deviation (iFBB − iB). Moreover,
uS(1) = bp1 − c− iFBS > −iFBS − αS(iFBS − iB) = uB(0)
for a suﬃciently small deviation (iFBB − iB). Thus, the buyer prefers no trade
over trade, while the seller prefers trade. A completely analogous analysis
of the case (c; v) = (c; v) reveals that the in case, the seller prefers no trade,
while the buyers prefers trade. Given this expectation about the course of
renegotiation, the buyer’s expected payoﬀ is given by
E[uB] = F (iB)F (iFBS ){v − bp1 − iB}
+F (iB)(1− F (iFBS )){v − p1 − iB}
+(1− F (iB))F (iFBS ){−iB}
+(1− F (iB))(1− F (iFBS )){v − bp1 − iB},
where the renegotiated price
p1 =
(1 + αS)c+ αSv
1 + 2αS
in state(c; v) follows from the proof of Proposition 2. Collecting terms delivers
E[uB] = −iB + F (iB)F (iFBS ){v − bp1}
+F (iB)(1− F (iFBS )){v − p1}
+(1− F (iB))(1− F (iFBS )){v − bp1}.
The necessary first-order condition for the buyer using (7) implies that
f(iB)(F (iFBS ){v − bp1}+ (1− F (iFBS )){v − v + (p1 − bp1)} ≥ 1,
where f(.) denotes the derivative of F (.). Thus incentives are eﬃcient only
if
(F (iFBS ){v − bp1}+ (1− F (iFBS )){v − v + (p1 − bp1)} ≥ v − v.
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Re-arranging yields
F (iFBS ) ≥
p1 − bp1
(v − bp1) + (p1 − bp1),
or equivalently, if
F (iFBS ) ≥ 1−
1 + 2α
2α
v − c
v − v . (35)
The right-hand side of inequality (35) is positive because of assumption (8).
Thus, if the eﬃcient probability of the good state is too small, then concerns
for relative performance imply that eﬃcient incentive levels cannot constitute
an equilibrium. ¤
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Figure 1. The Druzhba pipeline within the current European oil pipeline network.
2
Contract1)
( p0 , p1 )
Investments
iS ≥ 0
iB ≥ 0
State of
the world ω
Cost function
c ( iS , ω )
Value function
v ( iB , ω )
Renegotiation?2)
( p0 , p1 )
Trade or
no trade
q ∈ {0,1}
Net rewards
xS = pq – c · q – iS
xB = v · q – pq – iB
Ex ante Ex post
Utilities3)
uS = xS – αS · max{xB – xS , 0}
uB = xB – αB · max{xS – xB , 0}
1) Trading at will (as in Hart and Moore, 1988): Contract specifies prices for quantities q = 1 (trade) and q = 0 (no trade).
2) Simplified renegotiation protocol (inspired by Noldeke and Schmidt, 1995): If both parties are willing to trade at the 
conditions of the original contract, then there is trade at those conditions. If precisely one party prefers trade over no trade
at the the conditions of the initial contract, then the other party may send a new signed contract proposal to that party. If 
neither party prefers trade over no trade at the conditions of the initial contract, then there is no trade.
3) Functional form as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Envy parameters αS and αB taken from [0;1). 
Figure 2. Time structure of the model.
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Figure 3. Concerns for relative performance do not impede materially efficient trade
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Figure 4. Indifference curves of seller (S) and buyer (B).
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Figure 5. Concerns for relative performance make renegotiation more likely
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Figure 6. Concerns for relative performance may therefore cause
underinvestment even in a very optimistic scenario
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